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Abstract
This article discusses the basic issues in the prohibition of abuse of market dominant undertakings in
Korea with emphasis on the dogmatic definition and systematics of abuse. In the process of rapid
development of the Korean economy, the concentration of large scale industries has been increased.
Through recent changes in market opening and deregulation, the pressure of market competition is
becoming fierce. Simultaneously, the risk that market dominant undertakings try to hinder, foreclose or
exclude actual or potential competitors grows. However, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
has not effectively responded to various types of abuse committed by market dominant undertakings.
The main cause of this situation appears to be that the Korea Fair Trade Commission and
commentators have failed to provide sufficient explanations about the nature of abuse. This article tries
to make clear how to understand, interpret and apply the abuse concept that has evolved in the social
and political context of Korea. This approach is expected to reveal some interpretative characteristics
of abuse.
I.  Introduction
A free market economy requires free and open competition, which in turn
enables private autonomy to operate. And private autonomy contains in its essence
freedom of contract, i.e. freedom to choose with whom to trade, decide whether or
not to trade and what the terms would be. Therefore free market economy denies a
system coordinated by mandatory obligation.1) However, free contract and free
competition, if not restrained, have a risk to destroy themselves. From long ago,
most of the modern jurisprudence had responded to such danger in laissez faire by
means of setting limits to the exercise of significant economic power. As a typical
limitation of private autonomy there have been legal restraints due to the lack of
equality between contract parties, so the competition law aims to prevent anti-
competitive conducts in the sense that it also tries to guarantee substantial freedom
of contract by means of limiting private autonomy and constraining market power.2)
Most industrialized countries treat the concentration of economic power by
individual firms as a harm and, therefore, apply legal controls to the conduct of a
firm having such power. U.S. antitrust law utilizes the concept of monopolization to
define the limits of permissible conduct for dominant firms, but virtually all other
competition law systems, including the Korean legal system, put the concept of
abuse of that power into practice to fulfill the same function. Article 3-2 of the
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereafter “the Act”) is a provision that
places particular obligation on undertakings holding market dominant position.
Conceptually, several methods of regulation are available to public authorities to
prevent or remedy the potential anti-competitive conduct by dominant firms harming
free contact and consumer welfare. One is public ownership or ex ante regulation,
which aims to protect public interests through the direct regulation of prices, output,
and other trade terms. The other is to prohibit certain types of conduct by these firms
ex post, only when such prohibitions are infringed. The latter is the approach of
competition law, which is taken by the Act. In this context, the Act tries to guarantee
1) Bong-Eui Lee, “Illegality of Unfair Trade Practices from the Viewpoint of Contract Order”, Fair Trade and
Rule of Law (November 2004), pp. 658~659.
2) Rittner, Vertragsfreiheit und Wettbewerbspolitik, Festschrift Solter (1982), pp. 27, 30; Fikentscher, Vertrag
und wirtschaftliche Macht, Recht und wirtschaftliche Freiheit (1992), pp. 30.
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those standards.5)
Abuse is to be challenged, only when the conducting firm has a market dominant
position. The Act defines the term “market-dominant undertaking” any one holding
market position who can determine, maintain, or change the prices, quantity or quality
of commodities or services or other terms and conditions of business as a supplier or
customer in a particular business area, individually or jointly with other undertakings.6)
The Article 2 No. 7 further addresses that a dominant position can exist individually or
jointly with other undertakings and it can be inferred that the Act recognizes, although
implicitly, so called the “collective market dominance”.7) However, the concept has
never been put into use by the KFTC and the courts, and under what circumstances the
existence of a collective dominance  can be inferred, is still unclear.
The wording of Article 3-2 of the Act refers to market dominant undertakings,
not monopoly or oligopoly. Under this usage, a market dominant undertaking is a
firm that holds a prevailing or exclusive position in a market as measured by
structural indicia, such as market share and barriers to entry, etc. Such an
understanding of dominance  naively coincides with the concept of monopolization
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.8)
A. Definition of relevant market
In determining the existence of a dominant position, it is first necessary to
identify the relevant markets. “Particular business area” in terms of the Act means an
area in which any competitive relation exists or may exist, by the product, stage of
trade, or geographical area of such trade.9) Relevant product refers to the aggregate of
and European Approaches to the Control of Economic Power (1970); Edwards, “American and German Policy
Toward Conduct by Powerful Enterprises: A Comparison”, 23 Antitrust Bull. 83 (1978); Schmidt, US-
amerikanische und deutsche Wettbewerbspolitik gegnuber Marktmacht (1973).
5) Gerber, supra note 3.
6) Article 2 No. 7 of the Act.
7) The concept “collective market dominance” had been developed in german and european competition law, so
far rarely applied. See generally, Faull/Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (1999), pp. 138~140.
8) Sullivan/Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook (2000), pp. 75~76.
9) Article 2 No. 3 of the Act.
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room for free enterprise activities by constraining unsound use of power in a
economic society and one of the main instruments for it is the prevention of abuse
practiced by market dominant undertakings.
The two legal approaches mentioned above are, notwithstanding some common
objectives, fundamentally different.3) They have evolved from different conceptual
and theoretical backgrounds; they are embedded in different legal traditions,
especially in relation to the role of government in economic activities; they are
shaped by different social and political pressures; and their enforcement is based on
different legal systems.4) Consequently, lawyers well acquainted with the U.S.
antitrust law frequently misunderstand the concept of abuse in its legal context and
its interpretation for individual cases. This lack of understanding the abuse concept
impairs, above all, the ability of Korean lawyers and competition authorities to
effectively respond to complicated business operations. Moreover, not only the
market dominant undertakings themselves, but those undertakings who would either
deal or compete with such undertakings are confused in pre-evaluating their conduct,
which would result in problems of compliance and wasteful disputes. This article,
therefore, responds to this lack of understanding by analysing the legal concept of
abuse of a market dominant position. The focus of this article is on analysing what
meaning is ascribed to the vague notion of abuse and how to systematize it. In
analysing Korean approach to abusive conducts, the article also makes clear
characteristics of the decisions of the Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereafter
“KFTC”) and the courts.
II.  Market Dominance
The concept of abuse of a market dominant position has two components; the
concept of abuse and the concept of market dominance. The former provides
conduct standards, the latter identifies undertakings whose conduct is subject to
3) It is much the same for the comparison between U.S. and European competition law approach to the
possession of significant economic power. Gerber, “Law and the Abuse of Economic Power in Europe”, 62 Tulane
Law Review 57 (1987).
4) See generally Joliet, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: A Comparative Study of the American
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of the following shall be presumed to be market dominant: 
a. market share of one undertaking is 50% or more; or 
b. the total market share of not less than three undertakings is 75% or more;
provided that those whose market share is less than 10% shall be excluded. 
“Market share” of the Act means the ratio of the price of goods or services that
the concerned company has supplied or purchased domestically to the total price of
goods or services supplied or purchased domestically during the year immediately
before the year that includes the date in which the activity suspected of violating the
Act’s Article 3-2 by the company ended. Provided, however, that it is difficult to
compute the market share based on price, the market share may be computed based
on quantity or production capacity.
It should be noted that in applying the presumption and prohibition clauses, an
undertaking and affiliated corporations thereof shall be regarded as a single entity.
For example, Hyundai Motor Company and its affiliated Kia Motor Company have
more about 70% market share in a domestic automobile markets, so they are
regarded as a single undertaking and therefore presumed market dominant
irrespective of the other competitors’ market share.13)
III.  Abuse
A. Typology
Article 3-2 itself does not provide any definition of what and under what
circumstances an abuse of market dominant position exists. There has been some
uncertainty regarding the nature of the abuse concept during the past 24 years of the
enforcement of the Act. It is partly due to the fact that the decisions of the KFTC and
the judgments of the courts are too few to allow some clear guidance to be derived
from them.14) Another reason is that there has been some conceptual uncertainty,
13) KFTC Decision, No. 99-130 “Hyundai Motor/Kia Motor” (1999.9.3). The KFTC acknowledged that their
aggregate market share for bus and truck would amount to respectively 74.2%, 94.6%.
14) To date, the number of cases where the KFTC ordered corrective measures regarding an abuse,  amounts to
about 30.
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 4, No.2, 2005
67
products to which major buyers of a specific product can switch, in response to a
significant and non-transitory increase in the price of such product or service in
transaction. Geographic market is similarly defined. The basic and common criterion
is inter-changeability from the customers’ view.10) The KFTC applies the same
definition of market without distinguishing abuse, cartel, and anti-competitive
business concentration, which is likely to cause some analytical problems in a
specific case.
B. Dominance
Generally, market dominance has been defined as a position of considerable
economic power. It should not, however, be regarded as an absolute concept. It is
rather a relative one as a matter of degree. The existence of a dominant position in a
particular case is normally referred from a number of factors, through which the
competition authority, the KFTC, considers at the outset from its own concept of
competition policy.
In determining whether an undertaking is market dominant, the KFTC would
therefore comprehensively take into account its market share, whether and to what
extent any barriers to entry exist, and the relative size of competitive firms, etc.
These factors, prescribed in Section III of the KFTC Guidelines of Reviewing
Abusive Conduct of Market Dominant Position11) (hereafter “the Guidelines) relate
to the structure of the relevant market, the primary indicator of dominance is among
others the market share of the challenged undertaking.
However, it is very complicated for the KFTC to identify market dominance and
therefore market participants can not often predict whether and under what
conditions they could be challenged because of unfairness of their conduct. One way
to overcome such legally uncertain situations and to alleviate KFTC’s burden of
proof is to presume market dominance depending on market share.12) Under Article 4
of the Act an undertaking whose market share in a particular market falls under any
10) See in detail, Sai-Ree Yoon, “Regulation of Business Combination under the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade
Act with Emphasis on the Case Law”, Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 2 No.1 (2002), pp. 1, 10~18.
11) KFTC Notification No. 2002-6 (2002.5.16).
12) Oh-Seung Kwon, Economic Law, 4thed., (Seoul, Beopmunsa, 2002), p. 159.
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Under this system, it is now widely acknowledged that abuses within the
meaning of Article 3-2 are conceptually divided into two categories, exploitative and
exclusionary or hindering practices. Exploitative abuses are those practices by a
dominant undertaking, while not directly harming competitors in the market, to
exploit the opportunities provided by market forces and to reduce the consumer
welfare. This reduction of consumer welfare or exploitative effects may take various
forms, such as excessive pricing, insufficient quantity of products, stifling
innovation(Article 3-2 I No. 1, 2, and 5). In contrast to exploitative abuses,
exclusionary or hindering ones are those practices, not based on normal business
performance, which are likely to harm the competitive position of the dominant
firm’s competitors, to foreclose or exclude them from the market altogether(Article
3-2 I No. 3, 4, and 5). Exclusionary abuses have in general as their object or effect
the maintenance or strengthening of the dominant firm, which is in turn likely to
result in long-term harm to their customers or end consumers. For that reason,
exploitative abuses are sometimes said to follow exclusionary ones.
B. Interpretative Issues
1. Teleological Interpretation of abuse
The Act seeks primarily to promote fair and free competition, thereby to
encourage innovative entrepreneurship, to protect consumers, and to strive for
balanced development of the national economy.18) In general, competition facilitates
consumer welfare and development of national economy, but if it conflicts with
other non-competition interests, the KFTC is able to consider exceptionally, so long
as the elements for an exemption clause, such as Article 7 II (Exemption of Anti-
competitive Concentrations) or Article 19 II (Exemption of Anti-competitive cartel),
the KFTC had applied only Article 23 I (prohibition of unfair trade practices). See KFTC Decision, No. 2002-001
(2002.1.8). The doctrine, however, plays recently an important role in the liberalization process of regulated
industries, such as telecommunications, electricity etc. See Dong-Kwon Shin, “Telecommunicationa law and the
Essential Facilities Doctrine in Europe and Germany”, Competition Law Journal, Vol 10, 2004, pp. 223; Hohmann,
Die essential facilities doctrine im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschrakungen, Nomos (2001).
18) Article 1 of the Act.
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because commentators influenced by U.S. antitrust law approach tried to interpret an
abuse according to the legal principles of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act without
explaining differences between the concepts of monopolization and abuse of market
dominant position. 
Article 3-2 provides exhaustively five different conducts of abuse as following:
1. an act determining, maintaining, or changing unreasonably the price of
commodities or services; 
2. an act unreasonably controlling the sale of commodities or provision of
services; 
3. an act unreasonably interfering with the business activities of other
enterprisers; 
4. an act unreasonably impeding the entry of new competitors; and 
5. an act unfairly excluding competitive enterprisers, or which might
considerably harm the interests of consumers. 
Categories or standards for abusive conducts are further determined by
Presidential Decree and the Guidelines. The revised Presidential Decree of 2001
introduced a somewhat troublesome type of abuse, as a subcategory of unreasonable
interference and entry impediment in No. 3 and 4, namely refusal to access to
essential factors.15) Under this concept, the Presidential Decree prohibits conduct by a
dominant firm refusing, discontinuing, or limiting, without any justifiable reason, the
use of or the access to essential factors for manufacturing, providing, or selling the
products or services of other firms or new entrants.16) There has not  been a single
case of abuse, against which the KFTC decided explicitly based on this so called
“essential facilities doctrine”,17) remains therefore much to be cleared.
15) This category of abuse seems to have modelled after Article 19 I No. 4 of the Act against Restraints of
Competition of Germany (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen; GWB), the origin of that article is in turn to
trace to the precedents of european and U.S. competition law. See generally Cheol Han, “The Essential Facilities
Doctrine under the Antitrust Law”, Journal of Business Administration & Law, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2003), pp. 423;
Beckmerhagen, Die essential facilities doctrine im US-amerikanischen und europaischen Kartellrecht, Nomos
(2002).
16) Presidential Decree Article 5 No. 3 and 4.
17) In a case of a collective refusal by 7 leading banks to allow access of another bank to jointly owned CD
(Cash Dispenser) network which could be qualified an essential factor to compete in virtual account service market,
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firm, could be sufficient for the KFTC to consider that the conduct with such effect
is abusive. In this case the prohibition of such abuses may seem ostensibly to protect
a particular competitor, it aims, however, to protect the remaining competition from
further concentration of the markets, and the competitors are indirectly benefited in
their continuance.
2. Acceptance of Rule of Reason?
The prohibition of abuse practiced by market dominant undertakings has as its
counterpart the illegality of monopolization or any attempt to monopolize under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Meanwhile, some Korean commentators made use of
the American approach of rule of reason developed by U.S. precedents for
differentiating illegal or normal restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.22) According to this approach, a conduct practiced by market dominant
undertakings should be sanctioned for an abuse, only if it can be established by the
competition authority, the KFTC, that such an anti-competitive conduct is not likely
to accompany any redeeming efficiencies or to enhance consumer welfare.23)
Abuse in terms of the Act, however, cannot be interpreted under the rule of
reason concept for the following reasons. First, like European or German
jurisprudence, the Act does not prevent any attempt to monopolize or
monopolization, but only abusive conduct of market dominant undertaking. Here the
concept of abuse contains special responsibility not to follow exploitative or
exclusionary practices, and whether any breach of such special obligation exits,
cannot be evaluated persuasively, only if based on purely economic analysis.24) On
the other hand, it is no doubt that the abuse concept leaves no room for application
of per-se prohibition. Under the abuse concept, it can be inferred that the illegality of
conduct by market dominant undertakings is likely to be accepted more widely than
22) See Sang-Seung Yi/Seung-Wha Chang, “Regulation Tying Computer Software under the Fair Trade Act -
An Analysis of the Competitive Effects of Incorporating Windows Messenger into Windows XP”, Seoul Law
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2002), pp. 301, 372, 380; more generally, Nam-Ki Lee/Seung-Woo Lee, Economic Law ,3.
ed., (2001), pp. 227~228; Ki-Soo Lee/Jin-Hee Ryu, Economic Law, 6. ed., (2004), pp. 213~214.
23) Yi/Chang, Ibid. pp. 374, 379.
24) Lee, supra note 1, pp. 672~673.
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are cumulatively satisfied.19) It doesn’t mean, however, that the Act is to protect the
interests of competitors before competition itself or to protect consumer interests to
the detriment of competition order. This is because the goal of the Act is to protect
competition as a fundamental economic order, not merely the means to safeguard the
private interests of competitors or consumers. This so called monistic approach is
compatible with the somewhat dogmatic approach, represented by the famous
German scholar in economic law, Prof. Emeritus Fritz Rittner, that competition has a
two-fold function, one is the constitutional guarantee, the other is the protection of
private rights.20)
In this regard there has been a large critic against the prohibition of monopolistic
abuse that has contributed only to protecting inefficient competitors. It may be the
case, only if the KFTC is, without its own analytical approach, ready to severely
intervene private autonomy of a market dominant undertaking. But in a market
where effective competition does not prevail, the maintenance or strengthening of
existing market power, unless it has not been the result of competition on the merits,
may restrain the remaining competition unfairly. Here the protection of the
remaining competition can be achieved through safeguarding other competitors from
unreasonable interference of dominant firms.
Market dominant undertakings are said to have a “special responsibility”21) not to
allow their conduct to impair remaining competition. Indeed, in markets where an
undertaking holds a dominant position, any further concentration of the market
structure could strengthen the market power of this undertaking, and conduct tending
to exacerbate market concentration could be considered as a monopolistic abuse. In
some cases, the weakening of one competitor or the exclusion of a single competitor,
which is the very result of unilaterally exercised abusive conduct by a dominant
19) For detail, Bong-Eui Lee, “Goals of the Korean Antimonopoly Act and illegality of anticompetitive
conducts”, Case study on Economic Law (2004), pp. 1~16. 
20) Rittner, Das Kartellgesetz als die magna charta des Unternehmens?, Festschrift Raisch (1995), pp. 483.
21) ECJ, Case No. 322/81 “Michelin” (1983.11.9). “A finding that an undertaking has a dominant position ist
not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a position, the
undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted
competition on the common market.” Imposition of such stricter obligation on a market dominant firm is not
explicitly found in the KFTC decisions, Special treatment of such dominant firms is, however, underlying Article 3-
2 of the Act.
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the conduct has as its object or effect no meaningful anti-competitive effect shall be
shifted to the challenged undertaking.26) It means that a conduct of market dominant
firms, which is likely to foreclose, exclude, even disadvantage other undertakings in
actual or potential competition or to (in)directly harm consumer interests, may not be
sanctioned, when the firm challenged successfully proved its innocence or
outweighing benefits.27)
C. Systematic issues
1. Abusive versus unfair conduct
Over decades after the enforcement of the Act it has not been sufficiently
discussed regarding availability of abuse in literature or in case law. One of the
reasons is  that in practice the KFTC has only in a small number of cases applied
Article 3-2 to abusive practices of a market dominant position, although many of
such practices should have been subject to a stricter prohibition of abuse in light of
the firm’s market power. Rather, the KFTC preferred the application of ban on unfair
trade practices which appears to have wider range of application in personal and
behavioral scope than the surveillance of abuse.28)
Meanwhile, it is widely accepted that the prohibition of abusive behaviors should
be regarded as lex specialis (special law) in relation to banning unfair trade
practices.29) Here in differentiating the protective interests of these two norms, it
could be explained why a conduct of market dominant undertakings should be
subject primarily to the prohibition clause of abuse rather than to that of unfair trade
practices.30) The former aims firstly to protect fair and free competition, especially
26) Supreme Court Decision, December 11, 2001 (2000 du 833).
27) Seoul High Court Decision, August 27, 2002 (2001 nu 5370) “Posco” 
28) Article 23 of the Act. Article 23 applies to all the undertakings regardless of their scale or market share and
condemns almost all the undesirable conducts in light of unfairness, anti-competitiveness and even economic
concentration. 
29) Kwon, supra note 11, p. 309~310; Lee/Ryu, supra note 21, p. 210.
30) For somewhat critical approach, Bong-Eui Lee, “A Refusal to Deal as an Abusive Interference of Market-
Dominant Position”, Korean Lawyers Association Journal [beopjo], Vol. 565 (October 2003), pp. 119, 125~127.
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in a monopolization approach in the USA.
Moreover, it should be noted that per-se and rule of reason concept in U.S.
antitrust law had been developed in the process of allocating the burden of proof, not
identifying material requirements based on statutory provisions. If application of the
prohibitions provided in the Act is concerned, then the burden of proof is derived
from statutory provisions themselves. This follows that under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act the plaintiff, the DOJ or the FTC should prove any appreciable
efficiency and net effect of the suspected practices, whereas in Korea, once the
KFTC proves the existence of an abusive conduct enumerated in Article 3-2 I of the
Act, thereafter the challenged firm shall take a burden of proof for any justifiable
intent or effects for its conduct, and finally the KFTC decides the case on the
grounds of all the feasible information.
Thus, the monopolization concept under the U.S. antitrust law coincides to a
certain extent with its Korean counterpart, but not to the full extent. The concept of
abuse under the Act takes more strict view on the unilateral unsound practices of
market dominant undertakings. Since the criteria are not exclusively based on
economic principles, but in greater part relying upon balancing some conflicting
values, it cannot be denied that firms would have much difficulty predicting when
and under what circumstances their conduct could be challenged or not.25)
3. Objective justification as an exemption?
As mentioned above, the Act knows neither the per se, nor the rule of reason
concept. Instead a practice by dominant firms will not constitute an abuse if it can be
justified on objective grounds. The KFTC does not challenge any internal growth of
a dominant firm as such, but only one resulting from unfair methods of competition. 
It should be distinguished between objective justification and exemption. The
latter could be granted by the KFTC, once the prohibitive requirements are fulfilled,
whereas the former could be considered as a defence within the full discretion of the
KFTC in deciding the illegality of that conduct challenged. The Supreme Court of
Korea went further that in case of a conduct not justifiable, the burden of proof that
25) Supreme Court Decision, September 8, 1998 (96 nu 9003); Supreme Court Decision, December 11, 2001
(2000 du 933).
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First, an abusive conduct of dominant firms has in general as its object or effect
potential or actual harm to consumer interests. In case of excessive pricing or output
restraint, it results directly in an increase of retail price to the detriment of consumer
welfare. If any practice hindering or excluding competitors concerned, such conduct
is indirectly likely to increase deadweight loss of consumer welfare through
maintenance or enhancement of market power in the long run.
Second, the prohibition of conducts enumerated under Article 3-2 I could not
effectively respond to complicated and newly arising abusive strategies in a
technology-based economy. In some industries, such as software, telecommunications
service, broadcasting, press, etc., there is a trend toward convergence. Convergence
often raises a so called tying problem which is not likely to be resolved by the
traditional dichotomy between abusive and unfair trade practices. Here Article 3-2 I
No. 5 gives room for successful intervention of the KFTC in technological tying. It
would be the case that recently Microsoft incorporated its Windows Messenger and
Windows Media Player into Windows XP Operating System.33)
Third, it should be noted that Article 3-2 I cannot effectively regulate various
forms of exploitative abuse, e.g. if interpreted in a way that the Act forbids only
excessive pricing, directly or indirectly. It is, however, necessary to prevent some
conducts, which could not exactly be based on cost/price analysis, but have an
exploitative nature as a whole, in order to protect consumer interest from monopolist
misuse of its power. It means that No. 5 as ultima ratio under the enumerative
system should be utilized to respond to anti-competitive abuses likely to severely
harm consumer interests by restraining technological progress, innovative capacity
of small and medium-sized enterprises. In this context it can be understood that the
KFTC issued an injunctive order to an excessive pricing against which Article 3-2 I
No. 1 is not simply applicable.34)
Finally, abuses are further divided into two categories: abuses by unfair trade
33) See Bong-Eui Lee, “Tying as an Abuse of de facto Monopolist, Microsoft”, Korean Journal of Law &
Society, Vol. 27 (2004.12), pp. 331, 340~369.
34) Supra note 13 “Hyundai Motor/Kia Motor”. In this case, the KFTC held that the increase of domestic prices
of bus and truck by Hyundai Motor and Kia Motor was abusive, because among other things they increased only the
price of bus and truck where effective competition did not function and increased only domestic prices, although
export prices decreased or remained stable.
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the remaining competition, because in a market where any market dominant
undertakings is acting, the effective competition lacks from the very existence of
such a position. That is, the primary object of the abuse norm is to protect the
structurally restrained competition from further concentration by means of an
abnormal instrument leveraged by the market power. In contrast to the prohibition of
abuse, the law of unfair trade practices pursues, varying case-by-case, the object to
challenge unfair methods of competition (unfair luring of customers, coercive
dealing, and interference in other firms’ activities), anti-competitive practices
(refusal to deal, discriminatory treatment, exclusion of competitors, restrictive
transactions), fixing unfair trade terms (discrimination in favor of affiliated
companies, abuse of superior position) and excessive concentration by business
groups (unreasonable subsidization of other affiliated companies).31)
Thus, the category of stifling the remaining competition committed by market
dominant firms concerns abuses; in a monopolized market it should be under Article
3-2 taken into account, whether the remaining competition would be weakened
and/or other up- or downstream markets are likely to be leveraged by monopoly
power. Where an effective competition prevails, it would be the case of Article 23,
whether the challenged conduct is likely to harm the ground of fair and free
competition and thereby to create any dominant position in related markets.
2. General clause implicit
As the Act illustrates types of abusive practices in an exhaustive way, the KFTC
seems to have been ready to apply Article 23 to conduct which superficially does not
fall under the prohibition of abuses. The drawbacks of this enumerative approach
could be cured by relying on Article 3-2 I No. 5 that prohibits an act unfairly
excluding competitors, or considerably harming the interests of consumer.
Qualifying Article 3-2 I No. 5 an implicit general clause could be justified as
following.32)
31) See Bong-Eui Lee, “Study on Issuing Guidelines on Unfair Trade Practices under Article 23 of the Korean
Fair Trade Act”, 2003 KFTC Research Project Report (2003.11), pp. 2, 5; in detail, see Ho-Yeol Jung, “Prohibition
of Unfair Trade Practices”, Lecture on Fair Trade Law (2002), pp. 388~395.
32) Lee, supra note. 1, pp. 662~664.
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A. Exploitative abuses
The concept of exploitative abuse is based on the Ordo-Liberal notion of “as-if”
competition, and it is primarily used to prevent dominant undertakings from
exploiting customers dealing with them, where such undertakings raise prices
beyond a level that a competitive market would allow, or from decreasing their
outputs without justifiable reasons other than a competitive market would demand.
This form of abuse has been viewed in Korea primarily as a means of combating
high consumer prices.36) In applying Article 3-2 I No. 1 and 2 to such cases, however,
there seemed to be a conflict between economic freedom and effectiveness of
corrective measures. If the KFTC could merely issue an injunctive order against a
dominant firm for having charged a over-competitive price, its ability to prevent
such excessive pricing might be quite limited. On the other hand, if the KFTC could
order that firm not to raise prices above a certain competitive level, this might be
viewed as economic dirigism. In that case the Act allows the KFTC to order a price
reduction, but it has been disputed so far whether the KFTC could define accurately
the degree of that price reduction.
Courts have had no chance to deal with direct exploitation, namely excessive
pricing. The Korean Supreme Court has dealt with only two cases of indirect
exploitation, where the restraints of output of powdered milk and soy bean oil
respectively by dominant producers in that market during 1997 to 1998 of the IMF
crisis were challenged by the KFTC.37) The cases were rejected because of analytical
errors made by the KFTC and objective justifications. The KFTC faced this issue in
1992 in a series of excessive pricing in a disguised form.38) The case involved the
sale of pan cakes at prices slightly above those which could have been charged in a
competitive market. Here the undertakings increased prices in terms of weight
36) Before the enactment of the Act there has prevailed wide range of price control over monopolistic or
oligopolistic industries in Korea. For detail explanations on the Price Stabilizing Act of 1975, see KFTC, 20 Year
History of Fair Trade in Korea (2001.7), pp. 19~25.
37) See Supreme Court Decision, December 24, 2001 (99 du 11141) ; Supreme Court Decision, May 24 ,2002
(2000 du 9991) 
38) KFTC Decision, No. 92-1 “Haitai Bakery”; No.92-2 “Lotte Bakery”; No. 92-3 “Crown Bakery”
(1992.1.15). 
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practices provided in Article 23 I, and those which are practiced by other
instruments not fully satisfying the prerequisites of that clause. Article 23 I contains
small but general clause in No. 8, which prohibits other unfair conduct not illustrated
in from No. 1 to No. 7. If any market dominant firm proceeds to such unfair trade
practices in a broader sense, it could be generally assumed that the illegality, namely
the risk of hampering fair trade order, grows much seriously. And this legitimates the
interpretation that all the unfair conducts prohibited under Article 23 I including the
general clause of No. 8 practiced by market dominant firms would fall under illegal
abuse of Article 3-2. More strict obligation and special responsibility imposed on
dominant firms to abide by competition rules, the necessity to broaden the applicable
scope of Article 3-2, and the status of lex specialis of Article 3-2 to Article 23 would
provide sufficient legitimacy of this approach.
IV. Application of the Abuse Concept
For over two decades after enactment of the Act in 1980, Article 3-2 was little
used.35) In part, this was due to the fact that during the 1970s and 1980s of economic
growth strongly driven by the government, more than half of Korean industries
experienced high degree of concentration. This caused at the outset the KFTC to
refrain from applying the abuse concept aggressively in some monopolized
industries, especially to publicly-owned undertakings. Instead, the KFTC utilized
Article 23 I. Furthermore, the reluctance to apply the abuse concept was particularly
due to the concept’s vagueness. This unclear situation created a significant risk that
courts would overturn corrective measures ordered by the KFTC and increased its
reluctance to enforce the abuse concept. There seems to be no meaningful signal for
change so far. Case law and legal scholarship have not yet provided a detailed
explanation regarding certain basic contours of the abuse concept.
35) See supra note 14.
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in conceptualizing competitive unfairness for the purpose of judicial review. Each
has primarily turned to the intuitively appealing idea of competition on the merits in
order to provide a fairness of conduct, and there are many who doubt its viability.41)
These doubts relate to whether the concept of “competition on the merits” has
sufficient analytical power to make justifiable and judicially available distinctions
among the various types of conduct. 
A difficulty in applying Article 3-2 to allegations of predatory pricing is to
distinguish legitimate, competitive conduct from anti-competitive strategy. A price
below cost may be objectively justifiable on legitimate reasons such as, for example,
the need to clear stocks or to meet a competitor’s more attractive offer. A refusal to
deal by a dominant firm will not be considered an abuse under Article 3-2, if it can
be justified on business grounds other than the intention to hinder or exclude a
competitor from the up- or downstream market. Such efficiency considerations have
featured, however, only to a limited extent in the case law. 
For instance, in Posco,42) the Appeals Court of Seoul condemned a refusal to
supply an intermediate product “hot coil” by Posco, to Hysco, a new entrant in
downstream end product market. In this case, the dominant undertaking in a market
for hot coil, Posco was fully vertical-integrated and itself produced final products.
The court gave no significant weight to the fact that the refused Hysco, a daughter
company of Hyundai Motor was to provide most of its steel products with the
Hyundai affiliates, and that  Posco was expected to lose its biggest client if it would
provide hot coil with Hysco. Here it could be partly argued that the court failed to
comprehensively consider the point how to approach rivalry between vertically
integrated conglomerate firms.
In the Yeong-Il Chemical case,43) the KFTC decided whether Yeong-Il, the
challenged firm who imported and sold the farm drug (Methyle Bromide), had
unreasonably foreclosed a new competitor wishing to enter the extermination service
market of imported plants by refusing to provide MB without any justifiable reason.
41) Mainly in case of unfair trade practices, see Jung, supra note 30, pp. 388~389; in detail, Dai-Sik Hong,
“The Illegality of Abuse of Superior Position”, Korean Competition Law Review Vol.7 (2001.4), pp. 278~280,
291~298.
42) Supra note 27.
43) KFTC Decision, No. 2001-22 “Yeong-Il Chemical” (2001.1.11).
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reduction of the cakes. The KFTC had found the weight reduction was another form
of price increase, the rate of increased price was above that of increased cost. Based
upon this analysis, the KFTC ordered the sellers either to reduce their prices or to
increase the weight of pan cakes by a specific percentage. In order to apply Article
3-2 I No. 1 and 2 in exploitative cases, one must posit a hypothetical competitive
price, the question of how to establish that standard is not yet fully answered. This is
another reason why exploitative abuse has been rarely dealt with.
B. Exclusionary abuses
While the application of exploitative abuse has been shown to be of limited
effectiveness, the focus of enforcement activities has been increasingly put toward
exclusionary ones. The main objective here is to protect the process of free
competition by preventing dominant firms from hindering, foreclosing or excluding
actual or  potential competitors by(through) using their monopoly power. But there
is much controversy concerning the analysis and interpretation to be applied to
exclusionary practices.
The central problem with this category of abuse is how to distinguish abusive
from competitive conduct. Competitive market assumes, by definition, that
undertakings, even dominant firms, attempt to cause economic harm to competitors
to win the game. Therefore the criterion for abusive conduct can be found mainly in
its characteristics or  competitive effects.
First, it could be argued that one can identify competitive unfairness as one of
the categories of abuse. Here the notion of abuse is used to prevent dominant firms
from using their economic power to achieve an unfair advantage in competition with
other firms, such as  through predatory pricing, unjustifiable refusal to deal, etc.
Another criterion is to be said anti-competitive effect, especially restraint of the
remaining competition and monopolization of other related markets.39) Intent to
foreclose or exclude competitors is not a necessary condition for establishing an
abuse, but is likely to be considered as circumstantial evidence.40)
Both the KFTC and the courts have encountered, however, significant difficulties
38) Seoul High Court Decision, August 27, 2002 (2001 nu 5370), “Posco” 
39) Ibid.
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activities of market dominant firms. In light of legal certainty and predictability of
market participants, the KFTC and the courts should develop in the future more
specific, consistent and legally sound criteria for distinguishing abusive practices
from competitive ones.
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The challenged firm provided that it had a long term contract with incumbent 11 out
of 16 extermination service companies and took an obligation to have sufficient
stock for stable supply of MB. The KFTC did not accepted this defense and held
such a refusal to be illegal.
V.  Conclusions
More than two decades have passed since the enforcement of the Act. As shown
above, however, many issues on the abuse concept remain still unresolved. Above
all, in determining the illegality of any business conduct by market dominant firms,
there seems to be disagreement to a large extent. Because of the concept’s
vagueness, there have been some fears that it would be interpreted so broadly as to
create significant discretionary interference with business conduct, to the effect that
not competition but inefficient competitors are unnecessarily protected. To the extent
that experience in applying the abuse concept has not through judicial standards
significantly limited the scope of application of abuse, such fears would come true.
Such an unclear situation is partly, but primarily due to the fact that, whereas
most industrialized countries adopting antitrust law treat the exercise of significant
economic power by individual firms as an abuse, many commentators and law
practitioners represent themselves from the U.S. antitrust approach utilizing the
concept of monopolization to define the limits of permissible conduct for dominant
firms. But the Korean legal system, like virtually all other competition law systems,
codified and developed the concept of abuse in its own social and political
backgrounds characterizing the greater role of government intervention than
elsewhere. The concept of abuse of a market dominant position is the primary legal
tool for regulating the exercise of economic power and its interpretation and
application are of great importance to understand free economic activities and their
limits in Korea. Furthermore, unlike horizontal restraints such as cartel, a conduct of
dominant firms as such does not hinder or exclude their competitors. Therefore a
comprehensive approach that can best reflect market conditions and business
practices at issue is all the more necessary.
Finally, as described above, the case law of the KFTC and the courts concerning
abusive practices have not sufficiently delineated the permissible boundary of
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